The act of sabotage in France against the rail network in the run-up to the opening ceremony of the Olympics is undoubtedly encompassed by the EU’s definition of an act of terror against critical infrastructure, unlike the sabotage against a cable in 2022,which NATO henceforth would be within the remit of NATO.
It is the French authorities’ responsibility to investigate the crime and persecute the criminals.
Under current rules, it is for the member states’ to invoke the EU’s alliance clause, where solidarity is de rigeur in the event of acts of terror and natural disasters.
Lets explore techniques for assessing radicalization and offender backgrounds:
The EU’s approach
The European Union (EU) takes a comprehensive approach to counter terrorism and radicalization. Here are some key aspects:
- Prevention of Radicalization:
- The EU focuses on removing terrorist content online, preventing radicalization among prison inmates, and supporting rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.
- Victims of terrorism also receive assistance.
- Protection:
- The European Commission supports EU countries in enhancing the protection of citizens and critical infrastructures against terrorist threats, especially in public spaces.
- Ensuring resilience against physical and cyber-attacks is crucial.
- Fight Against Financing of Terrorism:
- The EU adapts its instruments and measures to deny terrorists access to resources.
- Constant vigilance is necessary as terrorists and their supporters modify their methods.
- Cooperation and Coordination:
- While EU countries have front-line responsibility for security, EU-wide cooperation is essential.
- All relevant EU and national actors collaborate to tackle terrorist threats, regardless of the ideology pursued by terrorists.
Application
- Eu Counter-Terrorism/ COTER Network
The EEAS manages the CT Terrorism Network, which comprises experts deployed in Eu Delegations worldwide. These experts can collaborate to analyze the incident, as originally intended when placed in the Council under CT Coordinator’s office.
They should assess under the remit of the CT-advisor of the EEAS the impact on critical infrastructure, identify vulnerabilities, and recommend preventive measures.
- NATO-EU Task Force on Critical Infastructure Resilience
Nato and EU released a Final Assesment on critical infrastructure resilience.
The EU’s CT network should study the report to understand vulnerabilities and potential targets.
- Background targets and Risk Assesment
Analyze the offenders’ backgrounds, including personal struggles, experiences with discrimination, and social integration.
Conduct risk assesments to understand their potential for violence and radicalization.
- Prison and Probation Context
Consider the prison and probation context for violent extremist offenders (VEO’s)
Explore rehabilitation strategies, prison conditions, and reintegration efforts.
- Multi-agency Cooperation:
Collaborate with various agencies, including law enforcement, intelligence services, and NGO’s.
Share information and insights to build a comprehensive picture.
- Psychological mechanisms
Understand psychological factors involved in radicalization.
Extreme conviction and idealistic approaches may play a role.
- Gender responsive Approach
Prioritize gender-responsive counter-terrorism policies.
Consider the role of women and girls in in CT and P/CVE efforts.
- Looking inside
Examine the behavior of police officers, their motives and the effects in the receiving end and the violence emitted from our institutions, their malpractices and abusive methods contorting the human situation.
Draw conclusions on why our authorities should not abet humanity in losing the keys to paradise conferring an entirely meaning to lupus est homo homini.
Hypotheses:
Based on the available information, let’s create a hypothesis-based profile of the perpetrators of the recent sabotage on France’s high-speed rail network:
- Eco-Terrorists: Eco-terrorists could be motivated by environmental concerns. They might target critical infrastructure to raise awareness about ecological issues. However, there is no direct evidence linking them to this specific incident1.
- Organized Crime: Organized crime groups might engage in sabotage for various reasons, including extortion, revenge, or territorial disputes. However, such groups typically focus on financial gains rather than ideological motives.
- Extreme Right-Wing: While extreme right-wing individuals or groups have targeted infrastructure in the past, there is no specific indication that they were involved in this case1.
- Russia: Given geopolitical tensions, Russia could be a candidate. However, without concrete evidence, it remains speculative1.
- Iran: The warning from Israel’s Foreign Minister about Iranian terrorist proxies plotting to derail events adds an interesting dimension. However, this remains an assertion without direct proof1.
- Either of the Two Acting Through Organized Criminals: Collaboration between state actors (Russia or Iran) and organized criminals is plausible but challenging to confirm1.
Likelihood Assessment:
- Eco-Terror: Low likelihood due to lack of evidence.
- Organized Crime: Moderate likelihood, considering their history of targeting infrastructure.
- Extreme Right-Wing: Low likelihood without specific indicators.
- Russia: Speculative; low to moderate likelihood.
- Iran: Speculative; low to moderate likelihood.
- Collaboration: Difficult to assess; speculative.
Remember that this analysis is based on available information, and further investigation is necessary to pinpoint the actual perpetrators.
Implications
The political implications of France’s high-speed rail network has already had significant consequences:
- Disruption of Transportation: Delays, cancellations, and rerouting of trains can inconvenience passengers and disrupt travel plans.
- Economic Impact: Damage to rail infrastructure affects commerce, trade, and supply chains. It can lead to financial losses for businesses and the economy.
- Safety Risks: Derailments or accidents pose risks to passengers, crew, and nearby communities. Lives could be endangered.
- Public Confidence: Such incidents erode public trust in transportation systems and security measures.
- Investigation Costs: Investigating and repairing the damage require resources and time.
- National Security Implications: Sabotage highlights vulnerabilities and may prompt security reviews.
Efforts to restore normalcy and enhance security will be crucial
NATO-EU
The Eu is destined to assume full responsibility for acts of terrorism, but this doesn’t mean NATO and EU cant reinforce collaboration until DG Defence is up and running and the treaties revised.
- Increased Engagement: The EU and NATO should collaborate more closely, leveraging synergies. They can engage in dedicated scenario-based discussions, such as through the EU-NATO Foresight Seminar, to address major hazards and security context changes.
- Security by Design: Promote engagement among Allies, Member States, and the private sector. Encourage security by design principles for critical infrastructure to prevent vulnerabilities.
- Mitigating Measures: Develop key principles to improve resilience. Propose mitigating measures and remedial actions to address strategic vulnerabilities.
Randy Borum radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research, Journal of Strategic Security,vol.4, 2011.
What we do: Policies and actions
Counter-Terrorism
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/counter-terrorism_en?
NATO-EU
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_216631.htm?
Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalization in prisons and probation
Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism
https://www.coe.int/en/web/counter-terrorism/cdct?
Understanding domestic Radicalization and Terrorism – A National Issue within a global context.
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism?
A note on Joint Investigatory Team (JIT)
The US authorties have recommended to establish Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) into the circumstances of the teror attack in Burgos and its link to an incident , provoked by PET in Odense, in order to determine the degree of responsibiity by the involved police agents and the Israeli and Iranian intelloigenc eservices present in Odense or feeding Sarah’s Lunnd and her three colaborators, the Honey Trap Tina Dyhr Dupont, MOna Muslim and and the male agent and those agents auhorising the op, which was racted to and later coverewd-up by an attempt to bambuzzle me.
A JIT are collaborative efforts between countries to investigate cross-border criminal activities. Here’s how they work:
- Purpose and Duration:
- JITs are set up for a specific purpose and operate for a limited period (which can be renewed with agreement).
- The EU countries involved decide on the JIT’s composition, purpose, and duration.
- Initiative and Composition:
- Any EU country can propose the establishment of a JIT.
- The countries involved typically include those affected by the criminal activity or those with relevant information.
- In your example, Poland, Bulgaria, and Denmark could take the initiative if they have a stake in the investigation.
- Intelligence Services and Responsibility:
- JITs can investigate various aspects, including intelligence services’ involvement.
- If there are suspicions about Ehud Barak, Mossad, PET (Danish intelligence), or Iranian intelligence in the Odense incident, a JIT could explore this angle.
- JITs allow cooperation and sharing of information among agencies.
- Denmark’s Involvement:
- Given Denmark’s local authorities’ track record, it’s essential to consider their participation in a JIT.
- A thorough investigation could shed light on the alleged budgeted operation in the Skibhus-quarter in Odense.
Remember that JITs enhance cooperation, facilitate evidence exchange, and strengthen cross-border investigations.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/joint-investigation-teams.html
https://www.spymuseum.org/education-programs/spy-resources/language-of-espionage
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation_en
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS_IDA%282022%29739213_EN.pdf
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/739213/EPRS_IDA%282022%29739213_EN.pdf