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We believe the creation of a defensive state at the heart of Euroasia should be to the benefit of the citizenry and promote peace and democracy in the world.

 HØJE NORD, FRIHEDS SAL

Danmark, Europe, Uncategorised Posted on Tue, April 23, 2024 16:14:45

Høje Nord, friheds hjem,

ej for mørket til at true,

men for aloen til at lue og for liv til at gro frem,

Lad det bryde, lad det gære!

Stem ej strømmen, tål dens brag

NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) er ikke en NATO- eller EU-certificeret styrke i traditionel forstand. Det er et forsvarssamarbejde mellem de nordiske lande, herunder Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge og Sverige. Samarbejdet fokuserer på at styrke forsvarsevnen og sikkerhedspolitikken i Norden.

NORDEFCO arbejder tæt sammen med internationale organisationer som FN, NATO og EU for at tilføje værdi til det bredere internationale forsvarssamarbejde1. Med Finlands optagelse i NATO i april 2023 og Sveriges forventede optagelse i 2024, vil NORDEFCO spille en endnu vigtigere rolle i den nordiske region. Dette samarbejde indebærer ikke en formel certificering fra NATO eller EU, men det bidrager til regionens samlede forsvarsevne og er komplementært til NATO’s afskrækkelses- og forsvarsstrategi.

NORDEFCO’s aktiviteter omfatter fælles operationer, træning og øvelser samt udvikling af militære kapaciteter, hvilket styrker både de nordiske landes forsvar og den regionale sikkerhed og stabilitet.

For at udvikle en strategi, der gør NORDEFCO til en NATO- og EU-certificeret flådestyrke med potentiale for opskalering til en naval air carrier gruppe, kan følgende trin overvejes:

  1. Certificeringsprocessen: Start med at definere de specifikke krav fra NATO og EU for certificering af flådestyrker. Dette vil sandsynligvis omfatte interoperabilitetsstandarder, kapabilitetskrav og overensstemmelse med bestemte forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitikker.
  2. Kapacitetsopbygning: NORDEFCO skal udvikle og standardisere flådestyrker, der kan integreres med NATO’s og EU’s eksisterende strukturer. Dette kan indebære investeringer i nye skibe, opgradering af eksisterende fartøjer og udvikling af luftbårne kapaciteter.
  3. Politisk Engagement: Sikre politisk støtte fra medlemslandene og arbejde på at opnå en konsensus om den strategiske retning og finansiering af projektet.
  4. Transatlantiske og Europæiske Dynamikker: Forstå og navigere i de komplekse transatlantiske og europæiske forsvarsdynamikker. Dette indebærer at balancere USA’s interesser med de europæiske landes ønsker om større autonomi inden for forsvar og sikkerhed.
  5. Omkostningsestimering: Udfør en grundig omkostningsanalyse for at estimere budgettet for oprettelsen og vedligeholdelsen af en naval air carrier gruppe. Overvej også mulighederne for fælles finansiering mellem NORDEFCO-landene.
  6. Tysklands Rolle: Tysklands nylige indkøb af F-35 kampfly kan spille en central rolle i den nordisk-ledede flådestyrke, da disse fly kan integreres i en carrier gruppe og styrke den samlede luftkapacitet.
  7. Storbritanniens og Ruslands Reaktion: Strategien skal også tage højde for, hvordan Storbritannien og Rusland kan reagere på en styrket nordisk flådestyrke. Det er vigtigt at sikre, at opskaleringen ikke opfattes som en trussel, men som et bidrag til regional stabilitet.
  8. Langsigtet Vision: Udvikle en langsigtet vision for, hvordan NORDEFCO kan fungere som en integreret del af NATO’s og EU’s maritime forsvar, herunder etablering af en naval air carrier gruppe.
  9. Tysklands F-35 Indkøbsplaner: Tysklands planer om at indkøbe F-35 fly passer godt ind i en nordisk-ledet flådestyrke, da disse fly vil forbedre interoperabiliteten med andre NATO-lande og styrke den samlede luftforsvarskapacitet.

Denne strategi skal udvikles med omhu og i tæt samarbejde med alle NORDEFCO-medlemslande samt NATO og EU for at sikre, at den er realistisk, finansierbar og i overensstemmelse med regionale og internationale sikkerhedsmål.

For at udvikle en strategi, der gør NORDEFCO til en NATO- og EU-certificeret flådestyrke med potentiale for opskalering til en naval air carrier gruppe, kan følgende trin overvejes:

  1. Certificeringsprocessen: Start med at definere de specifikke krav fra NATO og EU for certificering af flådestyrker. Dette vil sandsynligvis omfatte interoperabilitetsstandarder, kapabilitetskrav og overensstemmelse med bestemte forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitikker.
  2. Kapacitetsopbygning: NORDEFCO skal udvikle og standardisere flådestyrker, der kan integreres med NATO’s og EU’s eksisterende strukturer. Dette kan indebære investeringer i nye skibe, opgradering af eksisterende fartøjer og udvikling af luftbårne kapaciteter.
  3. Politisk Engagement: Sikre politisk støtte fra medlemslandene og arbejde på at opnå en konsensus om den strategiske retning og finansiering af projektet.
  4. Transatlantiske og Europæiske Dynamikker: Forstå og navigere i de komplekse transatlantiske og europæiske forsvarsdynamikker. Dette indebærer at balancere USA’s interesser med de europæiske landes ønsker om større autonomi inden for forsvar og sikkerhed.
  5. Omkostningsestimering: Udfør en grundig omkostningsanalyse for at estimere budgettet for oprettelsen og vedligeholdelsen af en naval air carrier gruppe. Overvej også mulighederne for fælles finansiering mellem NORDEFCO-landene.
  6. Tysklands Rolle: Tysklands nylige indkøb af F-35 kampfly kan spille en central rolle i den nordisk-ledede flådestyrke, da disse fly kan integreres i en carrier gruppe og styrke den samlede luftkapacitet.
  7. Storbritanniens og Ruslands Reaktion: Strategien skal også tage højde for, hvordan Storbritannien og Rusland kan reagere på en styrket nordisk flådestyrke. Det er vigtigt at sikre, at opskaleringen ikke opfattes som en trussel, men som et bidrag til regional stabilitet.
  8. Langsigtet Vision: Udvikle en langsigtet vision for, hvordan NORDEFCO kan fungere som en integreret del af NATO’s og EU’s maritime forsvar, herunder etablering af en naval air carrier gruppe.
  9. Tysklands F-35 Indkøbsplaner: Tysklands planer om at indkøbe F-35 fly passer godt ind i en nordisk-ledet flådestyrke, da disse fly vil forbedre interoperabiliteten med andre NATO-lande og styrke den samlede luftforsvarskapacitet.

Denne strategi skal udvikles med omhu og i tæt samarbejde med alle NORDEFCO-medlemslande samt NATO og EU for at sikre, at den er realistisk, finansierbar og i overensstemmelse med regionale og internationale sikkerhedsmål.

NORDEFCO (Nordisk Forsvarsamarbejde) kan samarbejde med andre militære alliancer som EUROMARFOR og NATO’s Standing Naval Forces på flere måder:

  1. Fælles Øvelser og Træning: NORDEFCO kan deltage i fælles øvelser og træning med EUROMARFOR og NATO’s maritime styrker for at forbedre interoperabilitet og samarbejdsprocedurer.
  2. Operativ Koordination: De kan koordinere operationer i regioner, hvor deres interesser overlapper, for at sikre en mere effektiv brug af ressourcer og styrker.
  3. Udvikling af Kapaciteter: NORDEFCO kan arbejde sammen med disse alliancer om at udvikle nye maritime kapaciteter, som kan bidrage til sikkerheden i de relevante søområder.
  4. Intelligence Sharing: De kan dele efterretninger og situationsoverblik for at styrke den samlede bevidsthed om trusler og sikkerhedsmæssige udfordringer.
  5. Forsvarsindustrielt Samarbejde: De kan samarbejde om udvikling og anskaffelse af forsvarsmateriel, hvilket kan føre til bedre integration af våbensystemer og udstyr.
  6. Støtte til Internationale Missioner: NORDEFCO kan bidrage til internationale missioner under ledelse af EUROMARFOR eller NATO, hvilket kan styrke deres evne til at udføre operationer1.
  7. Politisk Dialog: Ved at fremme politisk dialog mellem NORDEFCO og disse alliancer kan de udvikle fælles forståelse og tilgang til regionale sikkerhedsspørgsmål1.
  8. Krisestyring: De kan samarbejde om krisestyring og humanitære operationer, hvilket kan forbedre deres evne til at reagere på nødsituationer.

Gennem disse samarbejdsformer kan NORDEFCO styrke sin rolle i det bredere europæiske og transatlantiske forsvarssamarbejde og bidrage til regional og international sikkerhed

The F-35 Lightning II has three main variants, each designed for specific roles and operating environments. Here are the key differences between the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C:

F-35A:

F-35B:

F-35C:

  • Catapult-Assisted Takeoff but Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR): Tailored for aircraft carrier operations.
  • Larger Wingspan: Features larger wings with foldable wingtips and increased control surface area for better low-speed maneuverability.
  • Robust Landing Gear: Equipped with sturdier landing gear to withstand the stresses of carrier operations.
  • Reinforced Tailhook: Has a reinforced tailhook for engaging with carrier arrestor cables.
  • Payload and Range: Offers enhanced range and payload capacity due to the larger wing area.

Each variant is tailored to the specific needs of the branch of the military it serves, ensuring that the F-35 can operate effectively in a wide range of scenarios and environments.

Germany’s interest in an independent deterrent to complement NATO’s defense strategy is part of a broader European defense evolution. The acquisition of the F-35B or F-35C by Germany could be argued from a strategic standpoint, considering the advanced capabilities these aircraft offer for carrier-based operations and the flexibility they provide in terms of deployment locations, including maritime regions controlled by Denmark.

The F-35B’s STOVL capabilities allow for deployment in areas with limited infrastructure, while the F-35C’s CATOBAR system is ideal for traditional aircraft carriers. Both variants would enhance Germany’s ability to project power and contribute to NATO’s collective defense, particularly in the maritime domain.

Denmark, having recently abolished its EU defense opt-out and joined the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), is now more integrated into EU defense structures23. In light of this, Denmark may seek reciprocal commitments from Germany to strengthen the community method within the EU, which emphasizes decision-making at the EU level rather than intergovernmental arrangements. This could be seen as a counterbalance to the influence of larger EU states like France and to ensure that smaller member states have a say in shaping EU defense policies.

Denmark’s strategic position in controlling waters that could be critical in the event of a conflict, including areas near the North Pole, adds to its leverage. The country could argue that its geographic location and control over potential strategic maritime zones necessitate a stronger voice in EU defense matters and a more integrated approach to European security.

In return for supporting Germany’s acquisition of F-35 aircraft, Denmark might request a commitment to the community method to ensure that its interests are adequately represented and that EU defense initiatives are more inclusive and democratic. This could involve a more significant role for the EU Commission and the European Parliament in defense matters, rather than decisions being driven solely by the largest member states.

Overall, the case for Germany purchasing F-35B or F-35C aircraft aligns with the need for a robust and flexible European defense capability, while Denmark’s position could influence the balance of power and decision-making within the EU’s defense framework, and by extension.

https://www.nordefco.org

https://www.euromarfor.org

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/these-navy-carriers-can-launch-special-type-f-35-fighter-183147

https://www.csis.org/analysis/solving-europes-defense-dilemma-overcoming-challenges-european-defense-cooperation

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1997-05-01/miles-go

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230305670

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/733512/IPOL_STU%282022%29733512_EN.pdf

https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/communitymethod-synthesis-ne-jdi-feb13-1.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA331578.pdf

https://science.howstuffworks.com/carrier-group.htm



FRAMEWORK ACCORD BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON

Middle East Posted on Sun, February 04, 2024 16:20:27

  1. Preamble

The State of Israel and The Arab Republic of Lebanon

Having regard  to their desire for establishing business-like relations based on cooperation

and conflict and their commitment to good neighbourliness as democracies and market economies;

Affirming    that this agreement is concluded within the framework of UNSCR 1397 &  

1525 and 1701;

Reiterating              their adherence to the principles of the Barcelona-declaration;

Determined             to open a new chapter in their relations in the common pursuit of peace and

                prosperity;

Confirming             the principle of land for peace in terms of UNSCR 242 & 338;

Recognizing            the contribution of comprehensive peace to a Middle Eastern state system

free of political interference and interactions respective of each other’s iden-tities;

Have agreed as following

2. Peace Agreement

A peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon is to be concluded five years from the conclusion of this accord, at which point full diplomatic relations will be established.

3. Border Commission

A Border Commission is established towards the delimitation of the land, sea and air borders between Israel and Lebanon, whose work is to be finalised during the course of this agreement.

4. Political Dialogue

A high-level political dialogue will be established between the parties in order to address and better understand mutual perceptions of security/insecurity.

A Regular Dialogue between the IDF’s Northern Command and the Lebanese Army’s Southern Command as well as the parties’ respective Border Police Commanders are to be conducted for the management of the parties’ border towards the dismantlement of the UNIFIL-mission accor-ding to separate agreements.

The delimitation of the Maritime Borders will be undertaken using the newest technological advances, and otherwise as well serve the purpose of joint exploitation of the sea bed as con-venient.

  1. Water

In order to ensure the development and deepening of bilateral relations, the parties agree to enter into agreements concerning water sharing pending the resolution of outstanding issues on water-ways crossing their mutual border, and agree to cooperate with regional and global institutions in developing their mutual interests in the policy area, without prejudice to third parties’ rights and interests.

  1. Peace and Conflict

A comprehensive programme to address all levels of peace-building between the parties are established at the conclusion of this accord.

Lebanon undertakes to assume full sovereignty over its territory and to disarm and reintegrate mercenaries and proxy-forces into regular army and law enforcement units, and otherwise as well integrate former fighters into society.

Israel undertakes to pursue peace agreements with both the Palestinian National Authority and with Syria, upon which comprehensive peace in the Middle East are hinged.

Israel undertakes to make $1bn available for UNRWA to address the plight of Palestinean refugees, residing or having taken refuge in Lebanon, resulting from war, towards settlement of this refugee issue without prejudice to the rights of third parties under international law.

  1. Peaceful Relations

Haifa University and the Issam Fares Institute will steer pertinent research projects and dialo-gues amongst academics of both countries and in the region in order to improve the mutual understanding for each other interests and concerns and the process through which images of enmities and friendship may arise and dissolve.

People-to people programmes will be established to underpin this dialogue.

8. Cooperation

The parties intends to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement to supplement normalisation of links, following the conclusion of a peace agreement(s), no later than five years from the initial-ling of this framework accord.

Explorative talks in both regards may be undertaken in due course.

  1. Entry into Force & Arbitration

This accord is subject to ratification according to the procedures provided for in the legislation of each Contracting Parties, and comes into force on the day of exchange of documents of rati-fication.

The accord shall be deposited in the Foreign Ministries of the contracting parties in English, Arab and Hebrew version, as notified to the UN Secretariat by virtue of the UN-Charter Article 102.

Should disagreement arise over the implementation of these articles, the parties agree to submit them to arbitration at the International Court of Justice ( ICJ).

Done,                                                                        March 202x

For Israel                                                                                         For Lebanon

Annexes:

UN MAP of The Blue Line

Terms of References of the Lebanese-Israeli Border Commission

Agreement between IDF and the Lebanese Army concerning Border Security



College of Europe: The way forward

Europe Posted on Sat, November 11, 2023 15:55:45

                      For some time now, I have observed the developments of my alma mater, College of Europe, with trepidation and growing concern. I graduated in 1995 as part of the fierce Ramon Llul-promotion. I want to see changes to how the College is managed and the product – the kind of candidates – it puts on the job market and onto the European institutions.

Here are some points for your use and consideration on how to put the College on a right keel.

1.The Diplomatic Academy

It is a welcome decision to establish a Diplomatic Academy, and a long-standing desire of the European Parliament since the publication of the Galleano-report I+II. But this is not the message College of Europe is sending when it runs two parallel tracks – a diplomatic academy and a master in diplomacy and international relations. This signals an unfortunate inclination to import divisions about what the EEAS is and should be: the external branch of the EU Commission, The Diplomatic Service of the EU, a prolonged arm of the member states. Clearly, the EEAS is and should be all three things at the same time. This is already discernible from the recruitment base of EEAS determined in Article 27. Lets build on that. So much more should momentum be building for CFSP to become an exclusive competence of the EU Commission ( via a merger of title V and Part V towards a shared competence in terms of artivle 2(2), QMW and an External Secretary). Instead, the students are made into guinea pigs and an arena for grown-ups to play out their disagreements. And the female practice of competing over their children’s education, dress and looks reinforces thsi impression and is a passion gone astray which often lead to abuses.  This nonsense must stop.

Thus, I expect the Administrative Council to make a decisions on merging the master program in diplomacy and the diplomatic academy as soon as possible based on a comparative study on other region’s diplomatic academies and a hard-nosed assessment of the optimal use of resources.

2.From Executive training to CoE – Centre of Leadership

The College of Europe has decided to establish an executive training module. I endorse this projet since the specialized nature of EU integration suggest special insights into how executive disciplines apply to an EU context. I want a sharpening of this trend by establishing a College of Europe Center of Leadership proper which shall offer courses at a substantial reduced rate to the students, which should be compulsory and possibly on-line. The course offerings would draw on existing offerings that are currently optional clusters within the generalised course program, and should be professionalized in cooperation with leading business schools such as LSE, IMD, Insead, Administradores, Stanford, Harvard, MIT. etc. The rank-and-file of the member state’s foreign ministries should similiarly do compulsory vocational training on-site or on-line at a higher rate. Alumni offered courses at a reduced rate. Outsiders invited in at full rate. In the future, public leaders and not mere bureaucrats are to come out of the educational fabric of College of Europe, candidates who are not being stressed and put through the pressure cooker but who are given  time to grow and given space to develop into creative, versatile and effective European public leaders.

It is not enough to be a man of peace. If you cannot think clearly, you cannot do good deeds. Personal development and professional training is a human right. And while the act of leadership is a performance act, developing into a leader is not one of man’s innate faculties but an applied art which often begins with an inner journey.

3.College of Europe-South in Tirana

This must be the oddest new kid on the block. I don’t doubt the need for a better-funded study of South Eastern Europe, the need for deep country knowledge, and the need for massive investments as the Eu reconstructs its enlargement startegy.,- Europe must be brought into Se Europe, Balkans into EU. The 2+4bn allocated by the EU summit in Tirana suggests like a tailor in Hell. It is high noon someone take the spoon into the right hand.

Turkey has an important role in underpinning Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans,has its own interests, but also need to internalise rather than instrumentalise Europe. The study of the foreign policies of the South East European countries seems a neglected area. The South-Eastern Europe straddles the Adriatic, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This has implications for the design of the program still to be grasped beyond litterary accounts. There is the Jewish heritage of Thessaloniki and Sarajevo, home to the Sarajevo Haggadah a propos ex nihilo creations. There are several works out now ( Bechev, Morys, Hannappi, Dallara , Geddes, Keil, Liebscher,Kentera, King and Frykman, Bartlett & Uvalic, Florian Bieber, David Nicolle, Pål Kolstø, Benett & Kincaid, Hans Vermeulen & van Boeschoten Migration in the Southern Balkans, Rashkova & Sankina, Grandits, Grigore & Dinu, Jens Schmitt, Hadzialic, Schreiner & Jens Schmitt, Istvan Vasary Cumans and Tartars, Russel King & Povrazanovic Frykman, Dragostiova & Ivanova. Dzankic & Keil, & Kacarska, Carola Sachse, David Nicolle’s Cross and Crescent , Rhoads Murphy Imperial Legacies, Dimitris Stamatopoulos’ European revolutions and The ottoman Balkans War, Frederick Anscombe, Stefka Parveva Village, Town, People. Erkan Karakoc & Ali Serdar Mete The Balkan Wars, Evguenia Davidova Wealth in the Ottoman Balkans, James D. Tracy Balkan Wars, Misha Glenny, Leyla Amzi Erdogular The Afterlife of Ottoman Empire, Daut Dauti Britain and the Albanian National Question, Aleksandar Pavlovic Rethinking Serbia-Albania Relations, Andrew Rawson Balkan Struggles: A century of Civil War, Invasion, Coomunism and Genocide, Sylvie Gangloff La Perception de heritage ottoman dans les Balkan, Mark Mozower, Alina Mungiu-Peppidi, Marie Janine Calic not to mention Ivetic and Kaplan on the Adriatic). That is to say, the stabilisation of the Western Balkans requires more than an EU membership perspective and anger management in Moscow’s direction. It has always involved dynamic disequilibria inside the EU , and turned around Serbia’s orientation, the quality of the politicians in Bosnia and Albanian nationalism. Underlying all this is the grand bargain between Germany and France, whereby EU would develop its defence policies in return for Turkey’s accession to EU, provided a solution on Cyprus and domestic reform, and between Germany and the United States whereby EU and NATO accession would run in parrallel. From the regional perspective, the accession of Macedonia and Montenegro remains a priority. To lead change, strong leadership and good management are necessary. Thus, the rationale of the Tirana-project is not convincing or has not been articulated in a convincing manner and does not address the challenges and opportunites of the situation. It seeks to shape an essentially open-ended process – on the cheap. The quality of the faculty is uncertain. It largely depends on the director of studies, who is now being hired.

We hear: The Albanian government wanted this. So what ? In Natolin, there was a campus and student residences. In Tirana, we are told there are modern dormitories in a high-riser out of which 15 cubicles are reserved for COE-students and that the Tirana branch will be housed temporarily in the ISE- institute and that Eu studies 30 years after the fall of the Wall remain buried in the Department of Philology – Hoxha. Another oddity is the title of the master offered: The Transformation and Integration master. By happenstance, I adhere to the transformation school and I am coaching in my leadership style, but since when has the educational streams of the College been titled after theoretical schools ? Is the problem the professors are not sufficiently trained in leadership ? Does Albania have a problem moving from myth to reality ?

I propose to shelve the project and to reinforce the training in subjects related to the south-eastern Europe, to increase the number of scholarships available for the Balkan students and to triple funding for the production of educational material on topical issues related to South-Eastern Europe. Support for changes in educational policy and recruitment of young talent may also underpin transformation of the Albanian institutions and should threfore be wholheaertedly endorsed by the EU throughout SE Europe within time, budget and competences and on a how to do it-basis.

Certainly, EU membership may contribute to mature Albania as a political nation, the relationship between generations and the state-society nexus. The College of Europe, however, is an elite European prep school, an open and multinational institution with its own road show where stundets learn, sleep and eat together in one ensemble. The intention is to make the CoE-alumni apt for collective action, to step in and make deals in the Europen institutions when things get off track or get stuck contrary to other bottom-up heavy universities. The College regularly act as a relay for policy-makers during the year of study both for its own sake to participate in the construction of Europe and, in order to socialize its alumni into their future roles and to underpin the esprit de corps of the fonctionnaires of the European institutions and the EU policy-making system. For a minority, this leads to conformism and even rhinoceritis. This has been sought rectified by a greater emphasis on critical thinking and rigoruos analysis, but this remedy only goes so far.

The College of Europe is not an agent of organisational transformation of existing structures let alone a tool for enhancement of the professional interests of mutually inseminated illyrian tribes.

Three possibilties: (1) A Joint Degree Program on South Eastern European Studies (2) The building of a campus with student residences covered by the Albanian government in return for which the College could contribute what it is able and willing to set aside (3) The financing of the Coe-South campus – building structures and student residences – by the EU and private funds in return for which the Albanian government pledges to build needed institutions in town and /or around the country such as business academies, universities, design schools, management schools, research institutes etc etc. No program should be launched before the physical and academic infrastructure is in place.

If the facilities are not the right ones and the salary structure not attractive enough, it becomes difficult to attract high quality academics, staffs and talents. The program must aim at hiring American, Serbs, Romanian, German, French,Italian, Scandinavian-Baltic and perhaps even a Turkish professor. You know who I think of. My support is otherwise as well premised on Coe-South, in time, encompass and attracts professor and students from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in a happy osmosis. Can Tirana deliver ? Is the College of Europe interested in engaging in earnest ?

4. Strategic alliances

Alliance-making is a natural part of what educational institutions do such as the one the College have with the Fletcher School of Diplomacy. This should be extended notably to IDC-Herzeliya, which is a private university that offers a certificate in European studies. After all, Hendrik Brugmans, the founder and first rector of the College of Europe, was a converted jew. This is not an original sin nor is  it right. We need to repair the world, Tikkun Olam the Jews call it, and the best thing to do so is to reach out to the Israeli institution who has the greatest potential to emulate the College’s ethos in the Middle East. I might add, 25% of Israel’s population feel European, 25% Middle Eastern, 25% Jewish and 25% replies they don’t think they belong anywhere. Whose mistake is it if we can’t provide our Jewish brother sind sisters with a sense of belonging and identity ?

5.Eu-China Chair

As the EU-China Cai is ratified, it is nearby that a new sponsor is found for the EU-China Centre. In time, this should lead to the delegation of certain tasks to the CoE  Eu-China Centre for the promotion of EU Studies in China, an important challenge and responsibility. On-line education is also potentially big business these days.

Can you follow me ?

Ilce dixit