Province-making ?

To effectively manage its relationship with Russia
on Bessarabia, EU and Romania
are increasingly coordinating their positions in function of EU’s strategic
partnership with Russia and Ukraine. Fruntasu
has denoted Russian policy in Bessarabia as province-making, and this might be a
sound departure point for an analysis of the respective parties’ evolving
positions. EU’s approach is a fairly mu-ted one, linked on the hand to overall
policy with two important partners and on the other hand to a solution of the
conflict. Russia
also has global interests, part of which are linked to arms control, the game
on which also evolve. At the same time, EU is looking towards a strengthening
of its Battle Groups and to the development of the ESDP Academy.

Our wish is that this shall facilitate conflict-resolution and promote
the relationship between EU and Russia
and between Romania
and EU on the one hand, and on the other hand put EU’s prowess in foreign
affairs to the fore and that of its policies towards its neoighbourhood. In
those words, or to that effect, President Medvedev spoke during his recent
visit to Copenhagen.
So let’s take a tour at the state-of-play:

I. Russian strategy in Bessarabia has four components

  1. Asserting the rights of
    urbanised Russian minority, opposed to the idea of Moldovan independence
    and sovereignty
  2. Supporting Russified Ukrainean
    minority, underpinning and sustaining the RU-led enterprise
  3. Maintenance of Russian troops
    in support of seperatists in Transnistria
  4. Dependency in the fields of
    Energy

II. Moldovan strategy

  1. Moldovan government has
    temporarily re-imposed visa on Romanian citizens
  2. The Gagauz autonomy government
    may claim a negotiation of the terms of its seccession in the event the
    Moldovan government does not pursue independence.
  3. Moldova has adopted Russian as an official
    language.
  4. Moldova pursues a clerical rapprochement

5.Moldova Gaz is controlled by Gazprom.

III. Romania’s strategy aims
at phased Westernisation, leaving the door open for re-unification, without
excluding rapprochement between EU-Moldova, even as she addresses her own authoritarian
impulses and nation-building needs.

  1. Romania has signed a considerable
    number of investment plans with Russia beyond the needs of the
    Lisboa-treaty’s provisions.
  2. Romanian government applies
    pressure by allowing double citizenship for all people with Romanian
    ancestry. Increasingly presented as a foil, replacing Europeanisation on
    both sides of Prut-ul.
  3. Romania wants financing for linking-up the
    Romanian grid and yet to be realised infra- structure roads, having conceeded Lukoil a slice of the Romanian
    down-stream market.

IV. EU’s Reponse ( EU-Moldovan
Association Council-meetings):

1.
Support
for the OSCE-led mediation effort

2.
Governmental
reform ( JHA, investment policies, anti-corruption, human rights)

3.
GUAM

4.
EUBAM

5.
EU-Moldovan
Association agreement.